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1 INTRODUCTION 
Quantitative risk assessment is a key in understand-
ing the underlying risks in the operation of the asset. 
Results obtained from such analysis can help engi-
neers to improve the design of the asset, to choose a 
maintenance schedule in order to minimise the risk 
or to justify that the risk has been reduced to the 
ALARP level, for example, as required by the regu-
lators in railway industry (Office of Rail 
Regulations, 2015). 
Cause and effect models have been increasingly 
used in railway industry to estimate the underlying 
risks in railway operations. For example, a Bow-Tie 
model, which is the state-of-the-art method to assess 
the risks quantitatively, is used by London Under-
ground and Railway Safety and Standards Board to 
develop safety risk models (Taig & Hunt, 2012). 
The Bow-Tie model is comprised of fault and 
event trees, where a number of hazardous events are 
considered as top events in the fault trees and initiat-
ing events in the event trees. In the Bow-Tie model, 
probabilities (or frequencies) of basic event occur-
rence are obtained from generic asset failure data 
(Muttram, 2002, Turner et al., 2002, Taig & Hunt, 
2012). 
Distinct features of the asset, such as the condi-
tion of the asset and its individual components, the 
planned operational usage, inspection and mainte-
nance policies, can have a significant impact on risk 
assessment. Currently such features cannot be in-
cluded in the Bow-Tie model, and therefore the 
analysis can be limited. The methodology proposed 
in this paper focuses on how such features can be 
taken into account by developing a simulation model 
for the operation and maintenance of the asset. De-
tailed information about the condition of the asset, 
its maintenance and operation can be used to simu-
late the outcomes and use the results, such as the 
frequency of failures in risk assessment. This paper 
demonstrates the proposed methodology and its il-
lustration to a case study. 
2 PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
The proposed methodology is based on the devel-
opment of a Petri Net model, its simulation and the 
incorporation of the gathered statistics in the Bow-
Tie model. The Petri Net model is built considering 
the condition and the deterioration of the asset and 
its components, the operation and the maintenance 
activities. The Bow-Tie model is then used to take 
account of the results of the Petri Net simulation in 
risk assessment. In this way, distinct features of as-
sets and information about the condition of the asset 
can be taken into account when using a well-known 
approach of the Bow-Tie model to assess risks due 
to asset performance. 
The main steps of the methodology are presented 
in the following sections. 
2.1 Main steps of the methodology 
1 The first step is to gather and analyse the infor-
mation available about an asset, such as the de-
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scription, failure and maintenance records, pat-
terns of operational usage. Such information is al-
so needed for the components of the asset. 
2 The second step is to build a Bow-Tie model for a 
hazardous event, consisting of a fault tree and an 
event tree. 
3 The third step is to build a Petri Net model using 
the asset information obtained in the first step, as 
well as considering what outputs are going to be 
necessary for the Bow-Tie model, developed in 
the second step. The Petri Net model can describe 
the following features: the daily operation, degra-
dation, spurious failures, inspection and mainte-
nance regimes and the related human errors. 
4 Once a Petri Net model is built, it is simulated us-
ing the Monte Carlo simulation technique to ob-
tain the predictions about the performance, such 
as the frequency of component failures. 
5 The outputs of the Petri Net model are then 
plugged into the Bow-Tie model to get risk esti-
mates of the chosen hazardous event. 
This paper focuses on the steps of the Petri Net 
development (step 3), therefore, other steps of the 
methodology are explained briefly. A short descrip-
tion of Petri Net is given below. 
2.2 Petri Net 
A Petri Net (PN) model provides a graphical repre-
sentation of dynamic processes in a discrete event 
simulation framework. The original concept of the 
PN developed by Carl Petri (Schneeweiss, 2004) is a 
directed graph with two types of nodes, called places 
and transitions. These nodes are linked by direction-
al arcs. 
A place in the PN can be marked with a token and 
it usually represents a particular state or condition of 
the system. The tokens can move from one place to 
another in a PN through the use of transitions to 
mimic the change of the state. 
The transition is enabled when all input places to 
the transition contain the amount of tokens that is 
equal to the multiplicity of the arc (usually the mul-
tiplicity is one, but a higher multiplicity can also be 
considered). Note that an inhibitor arc can prevent 
the transition to be enabled. These arcs are repre-
sented with an empty circle at the end of the arc. 
Once the transition is enabled, a delay time is 
generated (from a distribution assigned to that par-
ticular transition) that has to run out before the tran-
sition is fired. Note that this delay time can also be 
constant, as well as zero. 
After the transition fires, a token (or multiple to-
kens, depending on the multiplicity of the arc) is re-
moved from each input place and one token (or mul-
tiple tokens, depending on the multiplicity of the 
arc) is deposited to each output place. This way the 
changing state of the system can be modelled 
through discrete events to capture its dynamics. 
Several specific arcs and transitions are used in 
this study and they are discussed next. 
2.2.1 Reset transition 
When a reset transition (Andrews, 2013) fires, it re-
sets the number of tokens in the selected places. It is 
represented by a rectangle with leaning line pat-
terned fill, e.g. transitions T63 and T65 in Figure 9. 
2.2.2 Decision making transition 
When a decision making transition (Prescott & 
Andrews, 2013) fires, it adjusts the amount of tokens 
in the selected places, if the chosen conditions are 
true. It is represented by a rectangle with rounded 
edges, e.g. transition T64 in Figure 9. 
2.2.3 Probabilistic transition and arcs 
When probabilistic transition (Le & Andrews, 2016) 
fires, it puts a token to only one of the output places, 
based on the probability assigned. Output places are 
connected with probabilistic arcs. Probabilistic tran-
sitions are represented by a rectangle with a dashed 
line, e.g. transition T66 in Figure 10. Probabilistic 
arcs are represented by an arc ending with a filled 
square. 
A number of PNs are illustrated in the following 
section. 
3 THE METHODOLOGY ILLUSTRATION FOR 
A PASSENGER LIFT 
A passenger lift in an underground station is consid-
ered in this illustration. A brief description of a trac-
tion lift is given first. Then, the Bow-Tie model for a 
hazardous event is developed, followed by the Petri 
Net model. Finally, two scenarios are used to illus-
trate how the estimate of the risk for a passenger lift 
depends on the features that are disregarded in the 
Bow-Tie model. 
3.1 Asset description 
The drive for a lift, shown in Figure 1 is provided by 
a motor, which operates a gearbox to turn the drive 
sheave. The suspension ropes are wrapped around 
the drive sheave and the deflector sheave and they 
are connected to the counterweight and the lift car. 
Such arrangement of a lift is referred to as a traction 
lift. The braking of the lift is provided by a brake 
unit, which consists of a brake drum and brake pads 
(with brake linings attached) that are pressed against 
the brake drum, when braking is applied. 
For simplicity, only selected components of the 
traction lift are considered in this paper, such as mo-
tor, brake pads, gearbox, drive sheave and suspen-
sion ropes. The other components can also be con-
sidered as necessary. Note that, the distributions of 
failure times necessary to simulate the Petri Net 
models are assumed in this study. For example, Ex-
ponential distribution was used to model spurious 
failures, since it has a constant hazard rate (parame-
ter λ of Exponential distribution (Andrews & Moss, 
2002)), i.e. the probability of failure does not change 
with time. 
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Figure 1. Simplified diagram of a traction lift 
3.2 Bow-Tie model 
A simple Bow-Tie model for a hazard “Lift gets 
stuck in between landings” is considered. The Bow-
Tie model consists of one fault tree and one event 
tree. The fault tree is presented first. 
3.2.1 Fault tree for the hazard “Lift gets stuck in 
between landings” 
The hazard “Lift gets stuck in between landings” is 
considered to occur when the lift is in between land-
ings and the drive for the lift gets cut off. The drive 
for the lift can be cut off due to a number of reasons, 
as identified from FMEA (London Underground Ltd 
(LUL), 2015b): 
 Rope slip triggers unintended movement device. 
In this case study it is considered that this only 
happens when the drive sheave wears out. 
 Lift is over speeding and the overspeed governor 
is engaged. In this case study it is considered that 
this happens when either suspension ropes break 
or brake linings wear out. 
 Gearbox fails in operation. 
 Motor fails in operation. 
The fault tree developed for the considered haz-
ard is given in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Fault tree with a top event “Lift gets stuck in between 
landings” 
Note that the logic of lift getting stuck in between 
landings is represented in the system failure Petri 
Net, which is given in section 3.3.5. 
The rare event approximation (Andrews & Moss, 
2002) is used to obtain the probability of the top 
event: 
           AFPAEPADPACPABPTOPP   (1) 
where A is the event “Lift was in between landings”, 
B – “Drive sheave wears out”, C – “Gearbox fails”, 
D – “Motor fails”, E – “Suspension ropes break”, F 
– “Brake linings wear out”. 
Note that the probabilities for minimal cut sets, 
i.e. P(AB), P(AC), P(AD), P(AE) and P(AF) will be 
obtained from a Petri Net. 
3.2.2 Event tree for hazard “Lift gets stuck in be-
tween landings” 
The Event tree for the hazard considered consists of 
two events that help to classify the consequences of 
a lift getting stuck in between landings, as shown in 
Figure 3. The first event is whether there is a lift en-
gineer present on site to deal with the hazard. The 
second event is whether there are any people trapped 
in the lift. Combination of these two events lead to 
different end states, which are expressed in terms of 
lost customer hours. Note that the numbers of lost 
customer hours are only for the illustration and they 
do not represent the actual consequences. 
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Figure 3. Event tree for the hazard “Lift gets stuck in between 
landings” 
 
The following notation is used in Figure 3: Ci – 
consequence of each path i, Pi – path i probability, 
E0 is the initiating event, i.e. the hazard, Ej, j=1,2 are 
events 1 and 2, Ej = Y means that the event Ej is true, 
Ej = N means that the event Ej is false. 
The risk for the individual consequence is calcu-
lated by multiplying the value of the consequence 
(lost customer hours, in this particular case) by a 
path probability leading to the consequence (Ostrom 
& Wilhelmsen, 2012). In turn, the collective risk for 
an initiating event (in this case, the hazard “Lift gets 
stuck in between landings”) is then simply a sum of 
risks for the individual consequences: 
i
i
i CPR 

4
1
 (2) 
where R is the collective risk of the hazardous event 
“Lift gets stuck in between landings”. 
Note that the probability for people to be present 
in the lift will be obtained from Petri Net, while the 
probability for a lift engineer to be present on site is 
assumed, as described in Section 3.4. 
3.3 Building Petri Net model 
The Petri Net model is used to describe the follow-
ing processes: 
 Operational usage 
 Degradation process and spurious failures of in-
dividual components 
 Inspection 
 Maintenance 
 Functional failures 
 Human error in inspecting or maintaining the as-
set 
Note that individual PN models are built for each 
of the processes mentioned above, except for the 
human error in inspecting or maintaining the system, 
which is modelled in inspection and maintenance 
PNs. 
All of the individual PN models are then joined 
into a single PN model. The structure of the result-
ing PN model is shown in Figure 4. Note that the ar-
rows in Figure 4 indicate the dependencies between 
the PNs. For example, once a failure occurs in a 
“Degradation and failure” PN it interacts with “Sys-
tem failure” PN, which in turn interacts with “In-
spection” and “Operational” PNs. 
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Figure 4. Structure of a Petri Net model for a passenger lift 
 
The individual Petri Nets that are built for each of 
the processes mentioned above are presented in the 
following sections. 
3.3.1 Operational Petri Net 
It is assumed that the lift serves two landings: top 
landing (TL) at the street level, where passengers ar-
rive to the underground station, and the bottom land-
ing (BL) at the platform level, where underground 
trains are operated. Thus the Petri Net developed has 
the same structure for each landing, as seen in an 
almost symmetric Petri Net given in Figure 5. 
When the passengers arrive at TL (indicated by 
place P3), they request the lift (transition T1 fires a 
token to place P5 and straight back to P3). If the lift 
is in TL (a token present in place P1) and no passen-
gers are leaving the lift (no tokens in place P11), the 
passengers waiting at TL can enter the lift (transition 
T3 fires and puts a token in place P7 and back in 
place P5, this way enabling transition T5). It takes 
some time for passengers to board the lift, therefore 
transition T5 fires after a delay and puts a token in 
place P15, representing that now there are passen-
gers in the lift. Since the lift is in TL and the passen-
gers called the lift to go to the BL and the passengers 
are already in the lift, the lift can depart to the BL. 
This is done by firing transition T9 to put a token in 
place P9, which then enables transitions T15 and 
T19. The transition T19 fires instantly and puts a to-
ken in place P16 (and back to P9) to indicate that the 
lift is in between landings. The transition T15 fires 
after a time lag to indicate that the lift has descended 
to BL (a token is put in place P2). The passengers 
can then leave the lift (transition T12 fires and puts a 
token in place P12, which enables and later fires a 
token into place P14). This way the journey from TL 
to BL is completed. If there are passengers already 
present at the BL they can now board the lift and 
travel to the TL in the same manner. The process is 
then continued until there are passengers present. 
Note that inhibitor arcs are used here in order to 
reassure that the lift journey follows the order that it 
needs to. For example, the transition T3 allowing 
passengers to board the lift cannot be fired if the 
passengers from BL just arrived and they need to 
leave the lift first. 
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Figure 5. Petri Net to model operational logic of a lift 
 
The flow of passengers, requiring a lift, is mod-
elled in Figure 6. 
A token loops through different times of day, for 
example place P17 represents “Off-peak 05:30 – 
06:30”, P18 represents “Peak 06:30 – 09:30”). Each 
transition contains the information of passenger 
flows at each interval during the day (corresponding 
to an identified distribution from analysis of London 
Underground timetables (London Underground Ltd 
(LUL), 2015c). For example, for the morning peak 
time (06:30 – 09:30) represented by place P17, tran-
sition T21 becomes enabled and it fires at a frequen-
cy, modelled with a Normal distribution with mean 
of 90 seconds and standard deviation of 47 seconds. 
Therefore the passenger flow is generated to the bot-
tom and top landings (puts a token in places P3 and 
P4 in Figure 5). 
 
P17
T22
T24 P19
T26 P20
T28 P21
T30 P22
T31
T21
T23
T25
T27
T29
P18
Off-peak
05:30-06:30
Peak
06:30 - 09:30
Off-peak
09:30 - 16:00
Peak
16:00-19:00
Off-peak
19:00-00:50
Closure time
00:50-05:30
 
Figure 6. Petri Net to model passenger flow 
3.3.2 Degradation and failure Petri Net for individ-
ual components 
London Underground has a list of critical compo-
nents of the lift (London Underground Ltd (LUL), 
2015a), whose condition has to be inspected. These 
include: 
 Gearbox 
 Motor 
 Brake linings 
 Drive sheave 
 Suspension ropes 
Several states of the critical components are de-
fined by engineers and these are used to build the 
degradation and failure PN models for the individual 
components. Different PN models are built for re-
pairable (gearbox, motor) and non-repairable (drive 
sheave, brake linings, suspension ropes) compo-
nents. 
For example, a gearbox degradation and failure 
PN model is given in Figure 7. The gearbox can be 
in one of the following states (each state is repre-
sented with a place in the PN): 
1 As good as new (P23). 
2 Worn with normal noise (P24). 
3 Worn with unusual noise (P25). 
4 Requires urgent attention (P26). 
5 Failed (P27). 
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Figure 7. Degradation and failure Petri Net for a gearbox (re-
pairable component) 
 
The gearbox is assumed to be degrading (e.g. 
bearings are wearing out) over time, for example, 
going from state 1 to state 2 using transition T32. 
There is a probability of spurious failure (going 
straight to state 5 (transitions T33, T35, T37 or T39 
firing)), which can occur whilst being in any of the 
first four states. All of the repairable components are 
modelled in the same way in the proposed method-
ology. 
The degradation and failure PN model for the 
drive sheave (refer to Figure 8) differs from the deg-
radation model in Figure 7. The reason behind this is 
that the drive sheave is a non-repairable component 
and it actually incurs physical damage throughout 
the operation. Suspension ropes are looped around 
the drive sheave and thus the friction between ropes 
and drive sheave incurs groove wear on the sheave. 
Thus there is no spurious failure for this component. 
All of the non-repairable components are modelled 
in the same way. 
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Figure 8. Degradation Petri Net for a drive sheave (non-
repairable component) 
3.3.3 Inspection Petri Net 
The inspection PN model for the lift is shown in 
Figure 9. For each component, whose condition is 
modelled with the degradation and failure PN, an in-
dividual inspection PN model is created. Two types 
of inspections are modelled in this PN: scheduled in-
spection (place P48) and emergency inspection 
(place P54). 
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Figure 9. Inspection Petri Net for a lift 
 
When the scheduled inspection starts the transi-
tion T60 fires and puts a token in place P49 (“In-
spection has to start”) and P50 (“Lift has to be out of 
service, planned”) to put the lift out of service and 
stop passengers from using the lift (the passenger 
flow to the lift is stopped by inhibiting the transi-
tions (T21, T23, T25, T27 and T29 in Figure 6 in the 
operational PN model). 
The transition T61 fires after a delay, once the 
engineers have prepared the lift for inspection and 
the inspection is underway (token is put in place 
P51). Once all of the components have been inspect-
ed (tokens are present in places P62, P70, P78, P86 
and P94 representing the end of inspection for each 
component) the token is put in place P52 to repre-
sent that the inspection has finished. Given the find-
ings of the inspection (if there was any maintenance 
identified, tokens in place P53 are present) the lift 
can either be put back to service (transition T63 
fires, if not inhibited by tokens in place P53), or 
maintenance is scheduled and lift is kept out of ser-
vice until all of the failed components have been re-
paired (or replaced). 
When the emergency inspection starts (a token is 
present in place P54) the transition T64 fires a token 
to place P51 after a delay (the time it takes for an 
engineer to start the emergency inspection). Then 
the inspection follows the same routine as before, 
only this time the transition T65 is fired, once the lift 
is put back to operation. 
Transition T63 is a reset transition that resets the 
number of tokens in places representing inspection 
findings when no maintenance is necessary. Transi-
tion T65 resets the number of tokens in the same 
places as for transition T63 and in addition for the 
place that represents the scheduling of inspection. 
The transition T64 is a decision making transition 
(Prescott & Andrews, 2013), that adjusts the amount 
of tokens in the selected places, if the chosen condi-
tions are true. It is used to reset the tokens in the 
places that represent the fact that the lift got stuck in 
between the landings and the lift had to be taken to 
one of the landings and the passengers had to be re-
leased. 
The PN for the inspection of individual compo-
nent is built next. Since the inspection PN models 
for all of the components have identical structure, 
only a single PN is presented. 
The inspection PN model for a gearbox is given 
in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10. Inspection Petri Net for a gearbox 
 
Once the inspection is underway (a token is in 
place P51) the condition of the gearbox is identified. 
The possible revealed conditions of a gearbox (plac-
es P55, P56, P57, P58 and P59) are identical to the 
conditions modelled in the degradation PN (places 
P23, P24, P25, P26 and P27). The possible revealed 
conditions are connected to the gearbox degradation 
and failure model developed previously (refer to 
Figure 7) through transitions and arcs, as well as 
probabilistic transitions and probabilistic arcs. 
The probabilistic transitions and arcs are used to 
model human error during the inspection process. 
The actual condition of the component can be over-
looked when performing the inspection. Thus, a 
probability to incorrectly identify the current condi-
tion of the component is considered, except for the 
failed state, where it is assumed that the failure will 
be revealed during the inspection. 
For example, when the condition of gearbox is 
“Worn with unusual noise”, it is assumed that there 
is a 98% chance of correctly identifying this particu-
lar condition, a 1% chance to misidentify the current 
condition as a better one (“Worn with usual noise”) 
and a 1% chance to misidentify the condition as a 
worse one (“Gearbox requires urgent attention”). 
The resulting findings of inspection for a compo-
nent then influence the maintenance actions: no 
maintenance (place P60) or maintenance necessary 
(place P61). If maintenance is necessary a token is 
placed in place P53, which counts the number of 
components that need maintenance. This infor-
mation is then passed onto the maintenance PN 
model. 
3.3.4 Maintenance Petri Net 
The maintenance PN is built to model the way the 
condition of the individual components is restored to 
a certain health state after maintenance is carried 
out. A maintenance model for a gearbox is presented 
in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11. Maintenance Petri Net for a gearbox (repairable 
component) 
 
Once the need for the maintenance is identified (a 
token is present in place P61) after the end of in-
spection (no tokens in place P51), the transition 
T116 becomes enabled and maintenance of the com-
ponent is scheduled. After the time to prepare for 
maintenance has passed, and the transition T116 
fires, a token is placed in place P95 to indicate that 
the maintenance is underway. Depending on the ac-
tual condition of the gearbox one of the transitions 
T117, T118 or T119 is enabled. These probabilistic 
transitions have individual probabilities to restore 
the condition of the component to a certain state. For 
example, transition T117 has a probability of 0.8 to 
fire to place P23 (as good as new) and probabilities 
of 0.1 to fire either to place P24 (worn with normal 
noise) or P25 (worn with unusual nose). This way, 
imperfect maintenance can be modelled. 
All of the components, such as motor, that are re-
paired (rather than replaced) during maintenance are 
modelled in the same way. 
A maintenance PN model for non-repairable 
components is presented next. The difference from 
previous maintenance model is that there are no 
probabilistic transitions, i.e. since the component is 
being replaced rather than repaired or refurbished, 
the condition of the component is considered to be 
as good as new after maintenance takes place. Thus 
the transitions T129, T130 and T131 always fire a 
token to place P52 (refer to Figure 12). Maintenance 
PN models for the non-repairable components have 
an identical structure to the drive sheave mainte-
nance PN model. 
 
Drive sheave degradation and failure model
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Figure 12. Maintenance Petri Net for a drive sheave (non-
repairable component) 
3.3.5 System failure Petri Net 
The system failure Petri Net model, given in Figure 
13, simulates the way the hazardous event for a lift 
can occur using the failure logic provided by the 
fault tree (refer to section 3.2.1). 
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Figure 13. System failure Petri Net for a lift 
 
Any failure of the critical components will put the 
lift out of service (a token is fired to place P100). If 
the lift was in between the landings (token is present 
in place P16), a token is fired into place P101 to in-
dicate that the lift gets stuck in between landings. An 
emergency inspection is requested (a token is placed 
in place P54) at the same time as the lift goes out of 
service. When the lift is out of service the passenger 
flow to the lift is stopped by inhibiting the transi-
tions (T21, T23, T25, T27 and T29 in Figure 6) in 
the operational model. 
3.4 Estimating the risk of lift getting stuck in 
between landings 
The fourth and fifth steps of the proposed methodol-
ogy are illustrated in this section. Bespoke C++ 
software with a graphical user interface was devel-
oped to perform Monte Carlo simulations. Two sce-
narios are considered to illustrate how the risk 
changes based on the asset specific features. In par-
ticular, different conditions of individual compo-
nents are simulated in the PN. The scenarios that are 
considered for the Monte Carlo simulation are sum-
marised in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Two scenarios for Monte Carlo simulations 
Scenario #1 #2 
Number of simulations 10000 
Start time 05:30 
Duration 30 days 
Frequency of inspection 2 weeks 
Gearbox condition Worn with normal noise 
Motor condition Worn with normal noise 
Drive sheave condition 
Worn but 
serviceable 
Groove 
wear 
Brake linings condition Worn but serviceable 
Suspension ropes condition Worn but serviceable 
 
The condition of the drive sheave is different in 
the selected scenarios. The outputs obtained from 
Monte Carlo simulations (marking of selected places 
for each simulation) for the fault and event tree are 
summarised in Table 2. For example, if there were 
tokens in places P27 and P101, it indicated that the 
gearbox failed, when the lift was in between land-
ings, thus giving a minimal cut set AC for the con-
sidered simulation. 
 
Table 2. Outputs for fault and event trees from Monte Carlo 
simulations for two scenarios 
Scenario #1 #2 
Drive sheave wears out, P(AB) 0 0.0072 
Gearbox fails, P(AC) 0.0028 0.0011 
Motor fails, P(AD) 0.0028 0.0023 
Suspension ropes break, P(AE) 0 0 
Brake linings wear out, P(AF) 0 0 
People are present in the lift, 
P(E2 = Y) 
0.8036 0.8113 
 
Note that the frequencies (as representatives of 
probabilities) for fault trees are expressed as num-
bers of occurrences of considered minimal cut sets 
divided by the total simulation runs. For example, in 
the 2
nd
 scenario, a minimal cut set AB (event A – lift 
was in between landing and event, token in place 
P101 in PN, B – drive sheave wears out, token in 
place P56 in PN) has occurred in 72 out of 10000 
simulations. Thus the frequency is calculated as 
P(AB) = 72/10000 = 0.0072 / 30 days. 
The frequency for an event “People are present in 
the lift” to be true is obtained by dividing the num-
ber of occurrences when people were present in the 
lift during an initiating event and the number of 
times the initiating event occurred. For example, for 
the 1
st
 scenario, people were present in the lift 45 
times out of 56, when the lift got stuck, thus the fre-
quency is 45/56 ≈ 0.8036. 
The presence of a lift engineer was not modelled 
in the Petri Net, thus the frequency for a lift engineer 
to be present at site is assumed to be P(E1 = Y) = 
0.75 for both scenarios. 
Using the fault tree analysis (see equation (1)), 
the top event frequency (the initiating event frequen-
cy in the event tree) is found as: 
  daysTOPP 30/0056.00028.00028.0
1#
  (3) 
  daysTOPP 30/0106.00023.00011.00072.0
2#
  (4) 
where P(TOP#1) and P(TOP#2) is the top event fre-
quency for the first and second scenario, respective-
ly. 
The top event frequencies in equations (3) and (4) 
are fed into the event tree (see Figure 3) and the fre-
quency of occurrence for each path is calculated. 
The total risk of the hazardous event is then calcu-
lated using equation (2) and gives: 
dayshourscustomerlostR 30/0199.0
1#
  (5) 
dayshourscustomerlostR 30/0377.0
2#
  (6) 
where R#1 and R#2 is the total risk for the first and 
second scenario, respectively. 
Even though, the numbers of lost customer hours 
are artificial, they indicate that the risk of the con-
sidered hazard depends on the actual condition of 
the lift. 
4 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A methodology to extend the Bow-Tie model with a 
Petri Net simulation model was proposed in this 
study. Petri Net models are very flexible, thus asset 
specific features, such as operational usage, degrada-
tion process of individual components, inspection 
and maintenance regime and human error in inspect-
ing or maintaining the asset, are easy to include into 
the model and were all considered in this study. This 
way up-to-date information about the asset instead 
of generic failure rates is used for estimating risk. 
The proposed methodology was applied to an under-
ground lift and it was shown how asset specific fea-
tures can impact the estimate of risk. 
The proposed methodology can be further devel-
oped to take into account different maintenance pol-
icies, as only corrective maintenance was modelled 
so far; include other components of the lift, such as 
the safety circuit; to account for entering additional 
evidence in the Petri Net, for example, how much 
time the component has spent in the current condi-
tion; and apply the methodology to other railway as-
sets, such as railway points and underground rolling 
stock. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
This work is funded by Innovate UK through project 
PCIPP: People-Centred Infrastructure for Intelligent, 
Proactive and Predictive Assets Maintenance with 
Condition Monitoring. The authors greatly 
acknowledge the support from Innovate UK and pro-
ject partners Thales Research & Technology and 
London Underground. 
REFERENCES 
ANDREWS, J. 2013. A modelling approach to railway track 
asset management. Proceedings of the Institution of Me-
chanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid 
Transit, 227, 56-73. 
ANDREWS, J. D. & MOSS, T. R. 2002. Reliability and risk 
assessment / by J.D. Andrews and T.R. Moss, Professional 
Engineering Publishing. 
LE, B. & ANDREWS, J. 2016. Modelling wind turbine degra-
dation and maintenance. Wind Energy, 19, 571-591. 
LONDON UNDERGROUND LTD (LUL). 21/01/2015 2015a. 
RE: Critical component checklist. Type to PCIPP PRO-
JECT PARTNERS. 
LONDON UNDERGROUND LTD (LUL). 21/01/2015 2015b. 
RE: FMEA Traction lift. Type to PCIPP PROJECT 
PARTNERS. 
LONDON UNDERGROUND LTD (LUL). 2015c. Timetables 
[Online]. Available: https://tfl.gov.uk/travel-
information/timetables/ [Accessed 12/11/2015]. 
MUTTRAM, R. I. 2002. Railway Safety's Safety Risk Model. 
Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, 
Part F: Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit, 216, 71-79. 
OFFICE OF RAIL REGULATIONS 2015. Common Safety 
Method for risk evaluation and assessment. 
OSTROM, L. T. & WILHELMSEN, C. A. 2012. Risk assess-
ment: tools, techniques, and their applications, John Wiley 
& Sons. 
PRESCOTT, D. & ANDREWS, J. 2013. A track ballast 
maintenance and inspection model for a rail network. Pro-
ceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part O: 
Journal of Risk and Reliability, 227, 251-266. 
SCHNEEWEISS, W. G. 2004. Petri net picture book, LiLoLe-
Verlag GmbH. 
TAIG, T. & HUNT, M. 2012. Review of LU and RSSB Safety 
Risk Models. 
TURNER, S., KEELEY, D., GLOSSOP, M. & BROWNLESS, 
G. 2002. Review of Railway Safety’s Safety Risk Model 
HSL/2002/06. 
 
